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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMMERCIAL FIXTURES AND FURNISHINGS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vsELDON ADAMS, an individual, and NEW LIFE
~EALTH SPA, by and through, ELDON ADAMS,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No. 14700

)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·>

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant sued Respondent, ELDON ADAMS, for

~e·pr!~ 1 0!

sold
FORSYTH, its principal officer and stockholder.

Respoadest•..as~~;:
'". ,4~~

the Lessor of the property under lease to GREAT ~RS, :H!~:~.:J
to the site of which property the goods in
by Appellant.

questio~ were del~~c

i.tf':
GREAT OUTDOORS, INC. breached its lease ancru~·;;,
.,,

-·~~

dent brought action for such breach, terminated theJ lease,· •11.dd;_..!wli&i"
re-possessed the property pursuant to Court Order iPld Judqme:rit:~' '~
Appellant seeks to recover its claim against GREAT OUTDOORS, l'RCiij
and/or WILLIAM LEWIS FORSYTH from the Respondent, Lessor, on the'l~i
theory of unjust enrichment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Following two pre-trial hearings with no fact~al disputes
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finally appearing, the matter was submitted to the Court on
simultaneous motions for summary judgment, supported by simultaneous memoranda and argument and reply memoranda of the Appellant
and Respondent.

Judgment of no cause of action was rendered

against the Appellant and in favor of the Respondent by the Honorable GEORGE E. BALLIF, District Judge.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial Court
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, ELDON ADAMS, is the owner of property at 1640
South State Street, in Orem, Utah.

On or about March 1, 1974,

Respondent leased said property, by written lease, to GREAT OUTDOORS,
INC., a Utah corporation.

Under the terms of the lease, the Lessee,

at its sole expense, agreed to complete such improvments in and
upon the property as its business needs might require and to promptly
pay and discharge all costs and expenses incident thereto, to the
end that no liens would be placed upon or against the leased properq
Thereafter, GREAT OUTDOORS, INC., the Lessee, and/or WILLIAM
LEWIS FORSYTH, its principal officer and stockholder, on their
own behalf and on their own initiative, contracted with the Appellant
for the purchase of materials to be used in the completion of such
improvements, which contract was negotiated with the understanding
between the Lessee and/or WILLIAM LEWIS FORSYTH and the Appellant
that the Lessee was and would continue to be solely responsible for
the payment of the price of such materials.

Materials were then

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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furnished by the Appellant to the Lessee and were subsequently incorporated in the building on the leased premises by the Lessee.
The Lessee subsequently defaulted in the performance of its
covenants in the lease of the Respondent's property and action was
instituted by the Respondent in the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County to terminate the lease and regain possession of the
property.

By judgment of the Court, the lease was terminated

and the property restored to the Respondent.

The Appellant filed

no claim of lien against the property or the interest of the Lessee· ''
therein and the time limited for filing such lien has expired~
The Respondent was not privy to any contraat between the ···
Appellant and the Lessee, and the Appellant has Dever instituted
any action to recover the price of said goods frp the Lessee,·11;
GREAT OUTDOORS, INC., and/or WILLIAM LEWIS FORSYfH, but

instead"'~.,

seeks to recover its claim, from the Lessor of th• property. , """
ARGUMENT
POINT

.-.,

I

THE LESSOR OF PROPERTY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COSTS OF
REPAIRS OR IMPROVEMENTS THERETO INCURRED BY THE'LESSEE.
A tenant who makes repairs to or improvements on demised
premises does so at his own cost, and he cannot involve his landlord in the expense thereof without the landlord's consent (49 Am
Jur 2d 702, Section 765).

A tenant has no inherent power to bind

his landlord for the cost of improvments or repairs made by him
to the premises, and, as a general rule, the tenant's creditors
have no greater right to charge the land with the value thereof
than the tenant would have.

(49

Am

Jur 2d 702, ?ection 765, citing

AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY v. PUEBLO INVESTMENT COMPANY

(CA. 8), 150
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F. 17; WALTER V. SPERRY, 86 Conn. 474, 85 Atlantic 739; BROWN v.
WARD, 221 N. C. 344, 200 SE 2d 324; GRIZZLE v. RUNBECK, 74 Arizona
92, 244 P 2d 1160; KNAUSS v. HALE, 164 Idaho 218, 131 p 2d 292).
In the absence of special circumstances, the tenant cannot, by a
contract with a third person, subject the landlord's reversion to
a mechanic's lien for the cost of improvements upon the demised
premises, although, of course, the Lessee's
leasehold might be subject to such lien.

own interest in the

(49 Arn Jur 2d 702,

Section 765).
Our mechanic's lien law, Section 38-1-3 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, recognizes that such liens can attach "only
to such interest as the owner may have in the property."

(See

BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY v. NICK GLEZOS, et al, 6 Utah 2d 226; 310
P 2d 517, wherein the Court recognizes that the Lessee's interest
under a lease may be reached through a mechanic's lien, but not
the interest of the Lessor, under normal circumstances).

On

principle, there is no better reason why a creditor dealing with
a Lessee should be permitted to pursue his claim against the
Lessor, personally.
In the absence of statute or of an agreement between the
parties, there is no obligation on the part of the Lessor to pay
the Lessee for improvements erected by the latter upon the demised
premises, even though the improvements are such that by reason of
their annexation to the freehold they become a part of the realty
and cannot be removed by the Lessee.

So, in the absence of

statute or of any agreement as to improvements, the Lessee is not
entitled to a lien therefor, in view of the rule that the Lessor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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J

J

assumes no liability for improvements made unless he expressly
agrees to be responsible therefor.

Moreover, ordinarily, creditors

of a tenant have no greater right to charge the land with the value
of improvements made by the tenant than the tenant would have,
(49 Am Jur 2d 718, Section 777; annotation at 25 ALR 2d 885, Sections
1 and 3) and the mere consent of the Lessor to the. :making of such
improvements does not render the Lessee the agent of the Lessor so
as to bind the Lessor to pay the costs thereof.
AI,R 992).

(Annotation 163

In order for a tenant (or tenant's creditor) to recover

for the cost of repairs, alterations, or improvements there :litustrts
be a distinct agreement on the part of the
them.

landil'.o~a

to pay fer· ,::::;

!

(49 Am Jur 2d 828, Section 860, citing ZANris~v·; FREOD7.''·~

HOTEL COMPANY, 256 Michigan 578, 240 N.W. 83, 80 Jlilt 534).
Directly in point in connection with the

.

'.
fore,~ing propos&~
,;··-·,t

,,;,,,

is tl)e case of HOWARD v. SOCIETA DI UNIONE E BENBFICENZA ITM.I.!UilR(
et al, a California case reported at 145 P 2d 694, where·the

G9ull~

said:
"We are cited to no authorities which justify a conclusio.n •l
that under evidence such as was adduced in this case, appellant is liable for the debts of the association merely b~cause
the structure was erected upon its land with its consent.
There is no evidence that plaintiff's assignors relied upon
the agreement between the society and the assqciation or
upon any conduct or representation or inducem~nt on the
part of the society or upon the fact that the land upon
.
which the structures were erected belonged to the society.; •••
There is no evidence that the society ever as~umed or agreed
to pay any of the debts of the association. Testimony is
to the contrary and there is no evidence from which any
contract between the society and the creditors can be implied or upon which an equitable lien can be premised."
In the case before this Court, it is clear that there was no
reliance whatever by the Appellant on the credit of the Respondent
and, in fact, the lease itself expressly imposed upon the tenant
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alone the responsibility for the payment of the costs of any improvements or repairs made to or upon the property by it.
"The a7t or act~ from which the law implies any contract,
must, in every instance, be voluntary and the law will
never imply a promise to pay where it would be unjust to
the pa7ty to.whom it would imputed and contrary to equity
so to imply it.
Further, the law will not imply a promise
against the express declaration of the party to be charged
made at the time of the supposed under taking .•... "
(66 ~
Jut 2d 944, Section 2)
While the Appellant in this Court takes the position that the
case is bottomed on the principle of "unjust enrichment" and that
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and other statutory
laws of the State of Utah are inapplicable, this position is contrary to the position taken by it at the trial level where copious
references to the Uniform Commercial Code were set out in the
Appellant's trial memoranda.

It is submitted, however, that in

considering the question from the equitable standpoint

of "unjust

enrichment" as applied to a third party who was not privy to the
contract or transaction between the Appellant and the Lessee of
Respondent's property who purchased the Appellant's goods reference
to some provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial code are pertinent
and appropriate.

For example, as an alternative to a money judgment

against the Respondent on the theory of "unjust enrichment" the Appt
lant has alleged that it is entitled to enter upon the premises and
remove its property.

Title 70 A-9-313, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

as amen?ed, provides in part:
"(l) the rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks,
tile, cement, glass, metal work, and the like, and no
security interest in them exists under this chapte: unless
the structure remains personal property under applicable
law ••••. "
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The above cited section further provides under sub-paragraph
tllree (3) thereof that even where a security interest attaches to
goods after they become fixtures, such security interest, if any,
is invalid against:
"Any person with an interest in the real estate at the time
the security interest attaches to the goods and who has not
in writing, consented to the security interest or disclaimed
an interest in the goods as fixtures."
·
It is clear, therefore, that the seller of goods which becq1J1e_
incorporated into a structure on land owned by a tqird party i~

L
~ .>·
1
•

the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work, and
J.

the basis of a duly executed and filed security

~n,trument

•

and
i!.t·

financing statement perfected by the seller as prQvided
70A-9-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,

.,_-

Qn°

the like, obtains no security interest in such property except

Jpy

tit>l.e :..:o
'•' '.,. ?!''

even if ~~

fnd

security interest in the property is perfected tllr•ugh t.)le
;

~ l~~1i

ex•ct1Jt:f4.~"J'"

'.·~

'

~ t1~•·

and filing of such security instrument and financil'lg f.tatement,
4
· inva
·
l i'd as agains
· t any person wi·th an in
· t eres
· t +n
the real
is

estate at the time the security interest attached f,o the goods

::(~

'"_¥
. . J,1'
, .... ·
~ 1.'~~~

unless tile owner of such real estate consented, in writing, to

'lf·1

·.:_..~"'~"
. .
·~

•,

such security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as
fixtures, neither of which actions has been taken PY the Respondent in this case, who is the owner of the realty.

If .there

is no security interest, therefore, in the Appellant as against
the actual purchaser of the goods, there can certainly be n9
security interest in those goods as against the Lessor of the
property which would entitle the Appellant to enter upon the
premises and remove the goods therefrom.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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'.~

·. :.,c;~

';i.-,

,
Further, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that the seller
may reserve title or collect on delivery, but if neither procedure
is employed, the result is a sale on credit and title passes to the
buyer on delivery.

(70A-2-310 and 401, Uniform Commercial Code,

UCA 1953, as amended.)

In the instant case, the Appellant did not

reserve any title and failed to collect full payment for the goods
on delivery.

As a result title passed directly to the Lessee-buyer,

Title 70A-9-113 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCA 1953 as amended)
also specifically provides that when a debtor has obtained passession of goods or materials from a seller, no security interest
in such materials can arise or be claimed by the seller without
an appropriate security instrument and financing statement duly
perfected, and even in that case, such security interest wbuld be
ineffective as against the owner of the realty.

All of these

sections negate, at least by inference, any valid claim of the
Appellant to the property or against the Respondent, personally,
predicated on principles of "unjust enrichment" or otherwise.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF THE RESPONDENT IN THIS
CASE SUCH AS TO RENDER HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM.
Out of this entire transaction, the Respondent has sustained
a substantial loss.

He has not profited in any degree from the

actions of his tenant.
One is ~unjustly enriched by retaining benefits involuntarily acquired which law and equity give him absolutely without
any obligation on his part to make restitution (66 Am Jur 2d 946,
Section 3, citing BUELL v. ORION STATE BANK, 327 Michigan 43, 41
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j

NW 2d 472; MEHL v. NORTON, 201 Minnesota 203, 275 NW 843, 113 ALR
1055).

Further, a basic principle underlying the rules in regard

to restitution and "unjust enrichment" is that a person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution
therefor.

Policy ordinarily requires that a perpon who has con-

ferred a benefit either by way of giving

anothe~

adding to the value of his land, or by paying

hi~

services,

or~

.i

debt, or even by

transferring property to him, should not be permitted to require
the other to pay therefor, unless the one
had a valid reason for so doing.

confer~ing

the benefit

Where a person· has officiously

conferred a benefit upon another, the other may l)e enricmed'·h1tt"'
is not considered to be unjustly enriched.

The !'Ule thus ··hai;"'tie: ·

effect of penalizing those who thrust benefits uJ'Ol'l others, ii.ea~''
protecting persons who have had benefits thrust upon
without admitting, that there was a "benefit" in the
In other words, any party has a right to decline
to perform an act on his account and he is not l:i.able under
i
contract" for benefits forced upon him, especially where

..:~~'";~·:
.
. .
~

µiereVas ."' ' ..

no request by the Respondent for what the Appellant did and th~
Appellant occupied the position of a "volunteer",
948, Section 5).

(66

Am

Jur'*'
_.~;.

_,t;\'-"_tl
- ,.

"The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contraet
between two othet persons does not make such third person
liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution."
(66 Alli Jur 2d 960, Section 16, citing: UTSCHIG v. McCLONE,
16 Wisconsin 2d 506, 114 NW 2d 854).
"Moreover, where a third person benefits from a contract
entered into between two others persons, in the absence of
some misleading act by the third person, the ~ere failure
of performance by one of the contracting parties does not
give rise to a right of restitution against the third person."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(66 Am Jur 2d 960, Section 16, citing:
supra).

UTSCHIG v. McCLONE,

"In other words, a person who has conferred a benefit upon
another, by the performance of a contract with a third person, is not entit~ed to restitution from the other merely
because of the failure of performance by the third person."
(66 Am Jur 2d 960, Section 16, citing: RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, Section 110).
"Ordinarily, the law imposes liability to pay for services
rendered by another only when the person for whose benefit
they were conferred requested their rendition. As a general rule, where a person performs labor for another without the latters request, however beneficial such labor
may be, he cannot recover therefor."
(66 Am Jur 2d 966,
Section 23, citing: TILLEY v. COOK COUNTY, 108 U.S. 155,
2 6 L. Ed • 3 7 4) •
Before there can be a contract implied for services rendered
and accepted there must, of course, be in fact an acceptance.
Moreover, the party sought to be charged must be in a situation
where he is entirly free to elect whether he will or will not
accept the work, and where such election will or may influence
the conduct of the other party with reference to the work itself.
Where a structure is permanently affixed (or a repair made)

to

real property belonging to an individual without his consent or
request, he cannot be held responsible because of its subsequent
use.

It becomes his by being annexed to the soil, and he is not

obliged to remove i t to escape liability.

He is not deemed to

have accepted it so as to incur an obligation to pay for it,
merely because he has not chosen to tear it down, but has seen
fit to use it.

(66 Am Jur 2d 969, Section 24, citing: PARSHLEY

v. THIRD M. E. CHURCH, 147 N.Y. 583, 42 N.E. 15; ZOTTMAN v.
SAN FRANCISCO, 20 Cal. 96; SUTTON v. UNITED STATES, 256 U.S.
575, 65 L. Ed. 1099, 41 S. Ct. 563, 19 ALR. 403) ·

J
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POINT III
THERE CANNOT BE AN EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONTRACT FOR THE SAME
THING EXISTING AT THE SAME TIME.
In this case, it is undisputed that there was an express
contract between the Appellant and GREAT OUTDOORS, INC., the Lessee
of the property, and/or its principal officer and 11tockholder, for

·'

'

the furnishing of the materials upon which the Appellant's clai~
against the Respondent is based.

It is only when parties do not

. ·"

expressly agree, that the law interposes and raise11 a promi8,~·
and no agreement can be implied where there is an express
existing.

(66

Am

Jur 2d 948, Section 6, citing:

agr~t

VERDI v

STATE BANK, 57 Utah 502, 196 Pac. 225, 15 ALR 6(11.

In

.

"It ii> axiomatic that where an express contrac:t
may not be implied."

HELltBJt ··

~ ~?

1
:11

·:.)~

. .; ._;;.

exisb:··~~f.;
. ;·~.;~.,.;,..;·
. '· w ~ · .,·'f;i
.

~ -=~~--,~..

Thus, an express contract precludes the existilllce of a ,._,_,..
~

contract implied by law or a quasi-contract:.

(66 1111 Jur 2d

"',

94!~'~1!.

numerous cases from the U.S. 811.preme"Couz:t ·

and various State Courts).

,

~

,/)

·~,.~1,. .:

cited Utah case, the Court said:

Section 6, citing:

:;~

;.<.,

1

;;1l

Inasmuch as the funda.11•ntal ba1d.s ..af;-,$

a cliilim of "unjust enrichment" is "implied

contrac~",

that claim·;;.

,

.~~:~

· •"

'.-4
,.

.. ,..~
' ... ,·.,
"~
'.

"'

<';;;

' ;>~,,,

in the instant fact situation is untenable.
POINT IV
APPELLANT CANNOT PROCEED IN AN
lmSPONDENT OWNER AND LESSOR OF
IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE WITHOUT
!mMEDIES AGAINST THE PARTY WHO
MATERIALS.

~

EQUITABLE ACTION AGAINST THE
THE PROPERTY UJON WHICH T~
FIRST EXHAUSTING ITS LEGAL
EXPRESSLY CONTRACTED FOR THB

The Appellants action against Respondent is in the nature
of a creditors bill or suit and jurisdiction for such a proceeding
can be acquired, if at all, only after the Appellant has exhausted
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
-11-may contain errors.

~:~

all of its remedies at law and demonstrates this fact to the Court,
It is the established general rule that a creditor cannot come into
equity to obtain satisfaction of his claim out of property not
reachable by normal legal process until he has exhausted his remedie
at law and shown them to be unavailing, and he must allege and
prove the fact of such exhaustion as a condition precedent to invoking the aid of equity.

(21 Am Jur 2d 9, Section 7).

Moreover,

it is the rule that before he can come into equity, the creditor
must have exhausted his legal remedies against the real, as well
as the personal, estate of the principal debtor.

(21 Am Jur 2d

9, Section 7).
In view of the foregoing general rule, a creditor who seeks
equitable relief to accomplish that purpose must, in order to comply with that rule, not only obtain a judgment against the principal
debtor as a condition precedent to his right to such relief, but
must, in addition, be able to show that an execution has been issued
in the form and manner required by law and has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part.

His complaint in equity must contain:

an allegation to this effect or show a legal and sufficient excuse
for not doing so.

(21 Am Jur 2d 18, Section 21.)

See also, SEFTON

v. SAN DIEGO TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, 106 P 2d 974, in which the
Court held that a "creditors bill" is an extraordinary proceeding
in equity and can only be resorted to after a judgment creditor
has exhausted all his legal remedies and has failed to collect his '
judgment, or it is made to appear that legal remedies would be unavailing.

In the case before this Court, the Appellant has nei theri

alleged nor proved such precedent action or any reason why such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
action would
have been unavailing.
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POINT V
ANY CLAIM OF THE APPELLANT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT is BARRED
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
The Claim of the Appellant against the Respondent1s essentially a

c1~im

that the Respondent is required to

~nswe~

for the

debt of another and any claim in this category is required by the
statute of frauds to be in writing.

(25-5-4 and

2~-5-5,

Utah Code

Annotated, 1953).
The principal cases of FLEMING v. WINEBERG, 455 P 2d 600,
and PASCHALL'S INC. v. J. P. DOZIER, 407, SW 2d 150, cited by
Appellant are not analogous to the case before thi1t Coµrt and
constitute precedents supportive of the position qf
The FLEMING v. WINEBERG case

.

involv~d

do~

11-h~ ApPell.U~_

I
an action by a ,seller
of

.

.-

r~~.aininq

/:j#
;'>~

--.-·._tile,';~

~:".;;·:;/¥)

to compel the assignee of the buyer to pay fo;i: ,tht:; ! lives-tock._
The cattle in that case were sold under a title

''··'

. ·'jf}

.:.~~~,J

cont:raQ$

which entitled the seller to repossess his .security in pie eveat.... ·.. :·,:
of non-payment and is not remotely in point with tlle 6cts
present case.

of

rii

tbe"

The PASCHALL' S, INC. v. J. P. DOZIJ!lJi case turned

··

.,.

primarily on the relationship between the defendan• owner of the
property and the purchaser of the goods and serviaos, who was bis
daughter, and the unjust enrichment attributed to tnat transactloa
was predicated solely upon that relationship.
CONCLUSION
The inescapable conclusion from the facts of this case and
the arguments and citations presented is that the ~otion of the

Respondent for summary judgment of no cause of action as against
the Appellant was properly granted and judgment of the trial Court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to that effect should be affirmed.

The facts of this case are

not consistent with any conclusion that a judgment based on
"unjust enrichment" against the Respondent, who was not privy to
the contract betweeen the Appellant and the Lessee of the prope'rty,
is warranted or justified on any equitable consideration and the
judgment of the trial Court should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
V. PERSHING NELSON
ALDRICH, NELSON, & WEIGHT
43 East 200 North
P.O. Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Defendant - Respond
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